The proposal attempted to update the protocol parameter (committeeMinSize), reducing the minimum allowable size of the Constitutional Committee from 7 members to 5.
The intent was to improve governance resilience by ensuring that the committee could continue to function if one or two members became unavailable. Under the current parameter, the committee risks becoming temporarily unable to ratify governance actions if its membership falls below seven before replacements are appointed.
The proposed change would not alter the intended committee size or its voting thresholds but would allow the committee to remain operational with fewer active members.
Assessment: Pass
Assessment: Mixed
Assessment: Low
| Dimension | Score (1–5) |
|---|---|
| Constitutional clarity | 4 |
| Governance quality | 3 |
| Execution credibility | 4 |
| Ecosystem value | 3 |
| Risk balance | 4 |
RCADA Vote: ABSTAIN
This proposal seeks to reduce the minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from seven to five in order to improve operational resilience while maintaining constitutional safeguards.
RCADA recognizes the rationale behind the proposal. Ensuring that the Constitutional Committee can remain operational in the event of temporary vacancies or member unavailability is an important consideration for the long-term stability of Cardano’s governance system. At the same time, the minimum committee size is a structural safeguard within the constitutional framework, and adjustments to parameters that shape the functioning of governance institutions warrant careful consideration and broad participation.
At the time of casting this vote, participation among DReps is extremely low and the proposal appears unlikely to reach the required approval threshold before the voting deadline. In such circumstances, the resulting signal from the electorate does not provide a sufficiently representative view of the ecosystem’s position on the matter. RCADA therefore does not believe that casting a decisive vote meaningfully contributes to the outcome of the action at this stage.
This proposal has also highlighted a technical coordination issue within the current governance process. Multiple parameter update proposals have been submitted referencing the same previously enacted parameter action. Because parameter updates must reference the most recently enacted action of their type, this situation can create potential conflicts where the first successful proposal invalidates subsequent ones that reference an outdated predecessor. While this does not introduce risk to the network itself, it does demonstrate the need for clearer coordination and communication around governance actions with on-chain effects.
RCADA believes improvements to proposal coordination and governance workflow will help ensure that technically sound parameter updates can be evaluated on their merits without procedural complications or avoidable conflicts.
This vote is recorded off-chain only. At the time this rationale was prepared, the proposal had already transitioned to a non-ratifiable state within the governance interface and the GovTool interface no longer permitted additional vote submissions, despite the nominal voting deadline not yet having elapsed. As a result, RCADA was unable to register a vote through the on-chain voting interface and therefore records this position for transparency and archival purposes.
For these reasons, RCADA records an ABSTAIN position on this action.